The that the Kuchi-Hazara dispute has already reached

main reasons cited by Kuchi were: (i) the attitude of local commanders (41
percent); (ii) the attitude of resident populations (17 percent); and (iii) the
loss of pasture through conversion of those pastures or parts thereof to
farmland (13 percent). Overall 37 percent of Kuchi in the survey stated that
they had con?icts of one kind or another with local populations regarding
access to summer pastures.

is little doubt that the Kuchi-Hazara dispute has already reached a dangerous
level. Already in 2008 political leaders were voicing concern that civil war
could begin in areas which have so far not been directly involved in the ?ght
against Taliban insurgents. Hazara leaders meeting in June, and again in July
2008, condemned Kuchi incursions, reiterated their ownership of the pastures of
Hazarajat and urged the Government and the international community to disarm
the Kuchi. Accusations that the Kuchi are being directly armed by the Taliban
(or even the Pakistan intelligence forces) are rife. On their side, Kuchi
accuse Hazara of looking to Iran for assistance, Hazara sharing the Shia faith
with Iranians. Hazara acknowledge they need to arm themselves to protect
against anticipated new attacks by Kuchi this year, but deny Iran is assisting.
There is increasing concern that the dispute has the potential to develop into
a wider con?ict, with both sides arming and resorting to violence. Based on
these risks, a number of international organizations, including the FAO, USAID,
UNEP, the World Bank and the Norwegian Refugee Council, have been working alongside
local stakeholders to help prevent and resolve con?icts over these pastures.

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UNEP, ‘Recommended Strategy for Con?ict Resolution of Competing High Pasture
Claims of Settled and Nomadic Communities in Afghanistan’, UNEP, Kabul, 2009.


Economic characteristics of most developing and
conflict prone countries include:

Ø  Low
level and inadequate living standards

Ø  Low Levels of Productivity

Ø  High
Rates of Population Growth and Dependency Burdens

Ø  High
and Rising Levels of Unemployment and Under-Employment

Ø  Heavy
Dependence on Agri-Production

Ø  Shortage
of Capital

is often argued that risk of conflicts in low income countries is high because
poor people have very little to lose in case they engage in wars hence rebel
organizations recruit them cheaply.This may not always be the case. However,
indirectly, low income does
advantage the rebels. Globally, the share of income which accrues to the government as tax revenue rises with
income. For example, most governments get
around 40% of national income as tax revenue. In the really poor economies,
like Ghana and Uganda in the early
1980s, the government was only raising around 6% of national income as taxation. This shrinks the
capacity of the government to spend on defense, and so makes rebel predation easier. Indeed, in low-income economies,
governments will naturally derive
about half of their revenue from taxes on primary commodity exports (directly or indirectly) so that their
revenue base is quite similar to that of the rebels. Thus, poor countries have
a high frequency of conflict because
governments cannot defend. Of course, there might be other reasons why poverty makes it easier for rebels. Poverty
might make people desperate or angry. However, if this was an important effect we would expect to find that
inequality made conflict more likely:
for a given level of average income, the more unequal is income distribution
the more severe the poverty of the
poorest. In fact, inequality does not seem to effect the risk of conflict.


The greed versus grievance is a statistical model created by World Bank
economist Paul Collier and Anke Hoeffler, an Oxford University researcher
to determine whether greed or grievance-based motives caused the outbreak of
civil wars between 1960 and 1999 in 161 states that were
surveyed”(Beswick and Jackson, 2011:41). The model had its findings
premised on economic accounts which explain rebellion in terms of opportunity
(greed) as contrasted with political science literature which mainly explains
conflict in terms of motive (Grievance). Collier-Hoeffler model made
comparisons of greed and grievance by way of using proxy measures in making
representation of each of the concepts. With reference to substitutes for
opportunity, collier and Hoeffler considered indicators of opportunity for
financing rebellion which includes reliance and extortion of natural resources,
donation from diasporas, donation from hostile governments, proportion of young
males in the society and the average years of schooling, weak government
military capability and the favorability of the terrain as well as the extent
of social cohesion (Collier and Hoeffler, 2001:3-6). In proxying objective
grievances as the motive for civil conflict, the authors also considered
measures of grievance such as ethnic or religious hatred, political repression,
political exclusion and inequality (Collier and Hoeffler, 2001:6-7). Based on
these proxy variables, Collier and Hoeffler concluded that “opportunity as
an explanation of conflict risk is consistent with the economic interpretation
of rebellion as greed-motivated” (Collier and Hoeffler, 2001:17). By this, the
conclusion reached above suggested that