Purpose and background
The purpose of this dissertation proposal is reflect
on the results of the largest peacekeeping mission, MONUSCO by gaining deeper
understanding of its practices for the last 18 years operating in the
democratic Republic of Congo, while the violence of armed groups seems
impossible to stop and democracy is declining.
As for the interest of the subject, it is of two
categories: theoretical and practical.
Theoretical because this reflection allows us to
have a precise idea about MONUC/MONUSCO, to know its structures and
functioning, the means it has to carry out its policy, to consolidate and
stabilize the peace in DRC;
In practice because the study of MONUC and MONUSCO
is also of interest as it contributes to the maintenance of peace,
peacebuilding and stabilization in the DRC
In order to better understand this research
purpose, it is necessary to have a better understanding of the background of
recent peacekeeping operations in DRC and the reasons behind its creation. It
was on November 30, 1999 with resolution 1279 that the United Nations decided
to deploy a mission in the DRC. Originally made of about 5,000 men and
responsible for observing the cease-fire, the United Nations Organization
Mission in Congo (MONUC) evolved to become the United Nations Organization
Mission 18 years later. United Nations for the stabilization of the Democratic
Republic of the Congo (MONUSCO), the largest (22,000 men) and the most
expensive (1.4 billion budget) mission of peacekeeping in the world.
Key questions and chapters outline
What are the results of
the largest and most expensive peacekeeping mission on the planet, MONUSCO?
Following this background,
research question to be addressed
in this study
is, what are the causes of UN
Peacekeeping mission failure in DRC conflict?
I seek to address the
following sub questions in order to flesh out concomitantly the main research
Additionally, each sub
question will be applied to create the analytical structure of each
Chapter in this study;
proposed here as the following:
Chapter 1: What is the role of UNITED Nations
Peacekeeping Operations (PKO)?
This chapter will provide
an overview historical background of peacekeeping operations and mandates and
how they evolve to date.
Chapter 2: To what extent has MONUC/MONUSCO, in its
mission, been able to maintain and secure peace in the DRC? Through in depth
analysis and literature on different operations conducted by the UN
peacekeeping missions in DRC, this chapter will outline numerous realizations
made by the aforementioned operations.
Chapter 3: How
important is the transformation of the mandate of MONUC?
By comparing the mandates of MONUC and MONUSCO,
this chapter will analyze the significance of this transformation or whether it
is a continuity.
Chapter 4: To
what extent has this transformation of MONUC to MONUSCO offer any chance of a
serious hope and thus a definitive return to peace and security in Congo?
Building off analysis literature and analysis in previous
chapter, this chapter will examine MONUSCO robust mandate since 2010 vis a vis root causes of the conflict in
DRC, and its impact on peacebuilding.
Chapter 5: Following
its shortcomings, how can UN peacekeeping in DRC structure and mandate be
improved to bring about lasting peace and security in Congo? This chapter will draw a conclusion by giving out recommendations
to secure a lasting peace in Congo based on current literatures.
Notion of Peacekeeping
notion of Peacekeeping operations (PKO) is not expressly contemplated under the
charter, this absence raises the question of its legal basis and its general
characteristics. However, this formal
absence of regulations has also played in its advantage, as it has allowed its
deployment to be carried out in many shapes and forms (Durall, 2013).
and characteristics of PKO
A PKO is
first and foremost an operation undertaken by the UN, which results in a
physical presence of “peacekeepers” on the ground and the fact that
the operation is that of the UN, although uses national quotas. Depending on
the nature of the operation, the presence of the UN may consist of a deployment
of military or civilian personnel, of police force or of observers, which
explains the variable number of personnel (from a few tens of up to 40,000 for
UNPROFOR in 1995). If initially the permanent members did not provide
contingents, which is no longer the case, because they are usually the only
possessors of adequate material means for the success of the PKOs. Similarly, a
country whose geographical position might give it special interest in an
operation can not provide a military unit. The responsibilities of the
Secretary General are numerous, since he negotiates the conditions for setting
up the operation: seeking quotas from the Member States, concluding an
agreement with the host States, appointing the command, establishing the
regulation of the operation, management of the operation and report to the
board on its execution.
The last element characterizing the PKO is the
conservative aspect, symbolized by the search for peace and the neutrality of
the operation at the political and legal levels. Traditionally, the mission of
the PKO was the interposition of opposing forces, the monitoring of the respect
of a cease-fire or the prevention of the resumption of hostilities to favor the
emergence of conditions conducive to a future political settlement. To this
generation of KPOs destined to ensure the
“silence of arms”, succeeded a second generation, whose mission has
expanded considerably. The extension of their mission concerns in particular
the reconstruction of the State, the control of electoral operations, the
safeguarding of the human rights or the humanitarian assistance, the UN having
become the “good at everything for international security “.
PEACEKEEPING OPERATIONS SYSTEM
As the PKO is only a substitute for collective
security, its principles have its limits on different levels.
The first limitation lies in the vagueness
regarding the use of arms. The ethics of the “blue helmets” could be
summarized, without being caricatural, by “the art of receiving blows
without having the initiative to retaliate”. The ethics of peacekeepers
has rightly been described as the “ethics of the policeman”. When the
Security Council decided to break the rule of self-defense, by authorizing the
use of force in Congo after the secession of Katanga, its decision was
stigmatized. The PKO symbolizes an international community often criticized,
the system is still diplomatic. PKO is constrained to aspects of the principle
of non-intervention in the internal affairs of a state, which is difficult when
a crisis presents both an international and an internal nature, intervention in
the Congo may again illustrate this assertion.
The last is
the risk of a PKO to fail, causing some disillusionment and undermining the
credit of the United Nations. If the Organization (UN) wants to establish
credible KPOs, it must at all costs avoid ambitions that are disproportionate
to the means at its disposal. In this respect, the extreme diversity of the
tasks that the United Nations must undertake in the context of the second
generation of KPOs has not failed to escalate these difficulties. Thus, its
action in Cambodia was perceived at best only as a half-success. Nor can it
persist in intervening if the belligerents have no intention of ending their
conflict and dragging the United Nations to a resounding failure (Somalia) or
impeding a process of national reconciliation (Angola). Without sinking into a
certain pessimism, let us not forget that the history of humans has been dotted
with crises, sometimes very serious.
realizations & catastrophic failures
Peacekeeping operations mission in Democratic
Republic of Congo has had three main stages:
containing the centrifugal tendencies of the transitional government, MONUC
made it possible to organize and secure the constitutional referendum and the
elections that gave birth to the Third Republic. 2007-2012:
While the United Nations was supposed to support the establishment of new
institutions and the reform of the security sector, the Kivu issue
progressively imposed itself and eventually dominated the UN agenda. DRC.
Unable to prevail over Eastern armed groups, MONUSCO faces two crises in Goma
(2008 and 2012), the last of which is a public humiliation for the UN. In 2012,
an armed group, the M23, seizes the capital of eastern DRC allegedly defended
by the blue helmets and the Congolese army. While the Congolese soldiers flee
by committing abuses against civilians, the peacekeepers watch the rebels take
the city. 2012-2015: the United
Nations is trying to take over the initiative and MONUSCO’s priority is to
“neutralize armed groups”. Its center of gravity is transferred from
Kinshasa to Goma, its military resources are strengthened (creation of an
intervention brigade and deployment of drones). The Congolese army and MONUSCO
are pushing the M23 beyond the DRC borders at the end of 2013. But since then,
no other armed group has been neutralized.
Goma crisis in 2012, triggered by the capture of the city by the M23,
underlines the obvious military inefficiency of MONUSCO. It also leads to a
complete focus of the mission on eastern DRC. With the creation of the
intervention brigade, the United Nations is trying to redo part of the solution.
However, the rupture between the Congolese government and the UN mission is
being consumed and MONUSCO is again driven to passivity by a host government
that continues to emphasize its sovereignty.
As this MA
dissertation will use a desk study, in which secondary data is the primary
source of information, ethical violation according to University of Manchester’s
strict research codes is not at risk. The only issue is to find appropriate academic
literature in English, as the mainstream academic literature on Congo and
MONUSCO is in French, but being bilingual, I will use both languages for
languages to the best of my ability for literature, while relying mainly to the
English sources to avoid misrepresentation.
resources can be accessed through UoM library and privately using a computer,
as most of the resources can be accessed using online databases, journals and
e-books and UN websites.
Proposed Timeline Plan
research will take place in a period of close 4 months, starting from early May
to late August. A work breakdown is outlined below:
research and write chapter 1.
chapter 2 after reading after reading and assessment.
analyze and write chapters 3 and 4.
with chapter 5 in the first 10 days of August then proceed with editing and
printing by the end of August.