According aim at protecting people from violence and

According to the U.S. Government’s Guide to
Countering Intelligence (2009), counterinsurgency (COIN) can be labeled as
“a thorough civil and military effort to defeat and deter the uprising and
address its root causes.” Uprising is the organized use of subversion and
violence to seize, cancel or challenge the political control of a region. It is
essentially a government in which all parties use force to create an effective
vacuum of political, economic and clout. ”

This counter-insurgency took place during the
official or political recognition of the occupying power of the government,
army or foreign police and the internal conflicts that involved the subversion
and armed rebellion.

Best anti-insurgency campaign “, the
political, security, economic and information components of the government’s
legitimacy by reducing the population impact of the insurgency. The
anti-insurgency strategy should aim at protecting people from violence and
increasing legitimacy: being insurgent “(U.S. Government Anti-Spy Guide,

Anti-insurrection is not studied as
conformism. It is the truth that there were more insurrections during the last
half of the 20th century than conventional wars. Even the most professional
armies scarcely devote the time and effort needed to understand these
asymmetrical conflicts, concentrating instead on the preparation of the great
traditional battles of this century. The result is that the most powerful and technologically
advanced armies can defeat more permanent armies with relative ease find it
extremely difficult to defy the Volt. For this reason, a policy to defeat a
conventional fighting army is usually counterproductive in counter-insurgency.
While in conventional combat, the most common use of brutality is used to
quickly overwhelm the rival army, in counter-insurgency it is necessary to use
violence in a more discriminatory way to prevent alienation . Population.
Ceasing rebels inside and outside and eventually reducing their armed units is
the basis of counter-insurgency.

Successful insurgency depends on internal and
external support. Internally, they depend on the local areas, recruits and
supplies of Indigenous Peoples. External support is crucial because rebels
often can not procure or buy artillery or equipment. Therefore, neighboring
countries can provide valuable weapons and equipment and security to the armed
elements. The real breakthrough in Vietnam during the war in Indo-china it was
the control of the Communist Party in China, and the Chinese soon began
offering valuable support. Although military operations may kill dozens of rebels
and the US acts in Vietnam, they can recover losses if the rebels continue to
receive workers and supplies. The internal and external aid to insurgents must
be denied before the army is seriously eliminated. To clear up internal rebel
support, citizens must be rescued and conquered their hearts and minds. This is
needed because even if the people be of the same mind with the government’s
reasons, it would be ineffective if the government feared against the rebels.

Apparently, the only way to
protect the community is to separate them from the insurgents. It is a
laborious process that takes a lot of time and effort. First of all, the army
must move to a restricted area with the guerrillas and force the largest group
of insurgents. Therefore, the army must fill the population centers to prevent
the return of the insurgents. Later, the community was banned to prevent them
from supporting the mutiny and the recognized residual insurgents.

This requires various security
measures such as stable supervision of the nation, the composition of their
associations, many problems, the issuance of identity documents. If people can
blame some of these measures, they are obligatory to defend the nation, broaden
its convictions and get rid of rebels and their political agents. These
political agents are essential to the insurrection because their associations
of opinions are very important in the formation and conscription of the
followers of the origin. Only then, after the insurgents were driven out of the
area and their political individuals were uprooted, it is likely that locals
believed in a return of the insurgents.

Winning the hearts and minds of people is also
vital. If it is true that eventually the population will help the government if
it seems that it will eventually prevail in the conflict, there is no better
substitute for effective anti-insurrectional opposition than having people
support you voluntarily. While full support of the population is impossible, it
is possible to obtain sufficient support to guarantee victory as well as to
marginalize the supporters of the rebellion. Supporting people requires sincere
effort to listen and complain. Needless to say, intelligent rebels have
promised to respond to public complaints, and if the government is able to
anticipate the prospect of guerrillas and implement the necessary reforms, it
will lose legitimacy, as the British promised. Independence from Malaysia
destroyed the reason for the Malaysian communist party during the emergency in
Malaysia. Although the government can not eliminate the legitimacy of an
uprising by lifting the cause, it can still win people. Rebels will be very
vulnerable when supported internally and externally. Not only are they lacking
weapons, human strength and materials, but they also have two of the greatest
benefits of shelter and shelter. This can only be done if the government has suppressed
corruption and incompetence in its own ranks, and has made an honest attempt to
improve the life of the subject and to respect its beliefs. Likewise,
authoritarian reactions that cause heavy civilian casualties and abuses by the
military can not be forgiven. If people see that the government really is
interested in prosperity and can protect them against rebellious reprisals,
their support will be won and the rebels will be isolated. The other way to suppress an uprising is to cut off
its external support. As stated above, the insurgents are taken to the military
primarily by relying on the indigenous people; usually the most valuable
weapons and equipment from foreign countries. Usually this is also true for
neighboring countries, but the material can also be shipped from the sea and
the air. Without this support, most of the insurgents do not talk about the
formation of conventional powers to overthrow the government, but they can not
continue effective guerrilla warfare. Enemy borders, coastal zones and the
airspace of the country to prevent materials from reaching rebel. The best
example of closing a border is perhaps the “Morice line” established
by the French on the border of Algeria and Tunisia, Cezayir F.L.N. It must be
supplied by Tunisia. This line covered most of the border, including minefields
and electric barbed wire, and was constantly patrolled by French mobile forces.
If it is too costly or impractical to close an enemy border, it is better to
monitor and continually monitor the border regions and, if possible, to get
support from the neighboring country, thus helping the two countries to close
the border. Anger. As long as the government has enough ships and airplanes, it
must be easy to rub the shores and protect airways. When resistances are taken from internal and external support, they will
be extremely vulnerable. Not only will weapons, labor and goods be consumed,
but all at once information about two 
greatest benefits, shelters and anti-rebellious movements will be neutralized.
Mao Zedong and the Chinese socialists will not be proficient to effectively
hide in the people and be hid in the cities and be captured or harmless without
the prop up of the people, or escaped to the remote regions of the nation,
because the Asians are abstracted from mutually the indigenous and the outer
allies. He escaped the destruction of autonomist forces in 1934, and then he
was in the Shaanix