According to the U.S. Government’s Guide toCountering Intelligence (2009), counterinsurgency (COIN) can be labeled as”a thorough civil and military effort to defeat and deter the uprising andaddress its root causes.” Uprising is the organized use of subversion andviolence to seize, cancel or challenge the political control of a region. It isessentially a government in which all parties use force to create an effectivevacuum of political, economic and clout.
“This counter-insurgency took place during theofficial or political recognition of the occupying power of the government,army or foreign police and the internal conflicts that involved the subversionand armed rebellion.Best anti-insurgency campaign “, thepolitical, security, economic and information components of the government’slegitimacy by reducing the population impact of the insurgency. Theanti-insurgency strategy should aim at protecting people from violence andincreasing legitimacy: being insurgent “(U.S.
Government Anti-Spy Guide,2009)Anti-insurrection is not studied asconformism. It is the truth that there were more insurrections during the lasthalf of the 20th century than conventional wars. Even the most professionalarmies scarcely devote the time and effort needed to understand theseasymmetrical conflicts, concentrating instead on the preparation of the greattraditional battles of this century. The result is that the most powerful and technologicallyadvanced armies can defeat more permanent armies with relative ease find itextremely difficult to defy the Volt. For this reason, a policy to defeat aconventional fighting army is usually counterproductive in counter-insurgency.
While in conventional combat, the most common use of brutality is used toquickly overwhelm the rival army, in counter-insurgency it is necessary to useviolence in a more discriminatory way to prevent alienation . Population.Ceasing rebels inside and outside and eventually reducing their armed units isthe basis of counter-insurgency.Successful insurgency depends on internal andexternal support. Internally, they depend on the local areas, recruits andsupplies of Indigenous Peoples. External support is crucial because rebelsoften can not procure or buy artillery or equipment.
Therefore, neighboringcountries can provide valuable weapons and equipment and security to the armedelements. The real breakthrough in Vietnam during the war in Indo-china it wasthe control of the Communist Party in China, and the Chinese soon beganoffering valuable support. Although military operations may kill dozens of rebelsand the US acts in Vietnam, they can recover losses if the rebels continue toreceive workers and supplies. The internal and external aid to insurgents mustbe denied before the army is seriously eliminated. To clear up internal rebelsupport, citizens must be rescued and conquered their hearts and minds. This isneeded because even if the people be of the same mind with the government’sreasons, it would be ineffective if the government feared against the rebels.
Apparently, the only way toprotect the community is to separate them from the insurgents. It is alaborious process that takes a lot of time and effort. First of all, the armymust move to a restricted area with the guerrillas and force the largest groupof insurgents. Therefore, the army must fill the population centers to preventthe return of the insurgents. Later, the community was banned to prevent themfrom supporting the mutiny and the recognized residual insurgents.This requires various securitymeasures such as stable supervision of the nation, the composition of theirassociations, many problems, the issuance of identity documents. If people canblame some of these measures, they are obligatory to defend the nation, broadenits convictions and get rid of rebels and their political agents.
Thesepolitical agents are essential to the insurrection because their associationsof opinions are very important in the formation and conscription of thefollowers of the origin. Only then, after the insurgents were driven out of thearea and their political individuals were uprooted, it is likely that localsbelieved in a return of the insurgents.Winning the hearts and minds of people is alsovital. If it is true that eventually the population will help the government ifit seems that it will eventually prevail in the conflict, there is no bettersubstitute for effective anti-insurrectional opposition than having peoplesupport you voluntarily. While full support of the population is impossible, itis possible to obtain sufficient support to guarantee victory as well as tomarginalize the supporters of the rebellion. Supporting people requires sincereeffort to listen and complain. Needless to say, intelligent rebels havepromised to respond to public complaints, and if the government is able toanticipate the prospect of guerrillas and implement the necessary reforms, itwill lose legitimacy, as the British promised. Independence from Malaysiadestroyed the reason for the Malaysian communist party during the emergency inMalaysia.
Although the government can not eliminate the legitimacy of anuprising by lifting the cause, it can still win people. Rebels will be veryvulnerable when supported internally and externally. Not only are they lackingweapons, human strength and materials, but they also have two of the greatestbenefits of shelter and shelter. This can only be done if the government has suppressedcorruption and incompetence in its own ranks, and has made an honest attempt toimprove the life of the subject and to respect its beliefs. Likewise,authoritarian reactions that cause heavy civilian casualties and abuses by themilitary can not be forgiven. If people see that the government really isinterested in prosperity and can protect them against rebellious reprisals,their support will be won and the rebels will be isolated.
The other way to suppress an uprising is to cut offits external support. As stated above, the insurgents are taken to the militaryprimarily by relying on the indigenous people; usually the most valuableweapons and equipment from foreign countries. Usually this is also true forneighboring countries, but the material can also be shipped from the sea andthe air. Without this support, most of the insurgents do not talk about theformation of conventional powers to overthrow the government, but they can notcontinue effective guerrilla warfare.
Enemy borders, coastal zones and theairspace of the country to prevent materials from reaching rebel. The bestexample of closing a border is perhaps the “Morice line” establishedby the French on the border of Algeria and Tunisia, Cezayir F.L.N. It must besupplied by Tunisia. This line covered most of the border, including minefieldsand electric barbed wire, and was constantly patrolled by French mobile forces.
If it is too costly or impractical to close an enemy border, it is better tomonitor and continually monitor the border regions and, if possible, to getsupport from the neighboring country, thus helping the two countries to closethe border. Anger. As long as the government has enough ships and airplanes, itmust be easy to rub the shores and protect airways. When resistances are taken from internal and external support, they willbe extremely vulnerable. Not only will weapons, labor and goods be consumed,but all at once information about two greatest benefits, shelters and anti-rebellious movements will be neutralized.Mao Zedong and the Chinese socialists will not be proficient to effectivelyhide in the people and be hid in the cities and be captured or harmless withoutthe prop up of the people, or escaped to the remote regions of the nation,because the Asians are abstracted from mutually the indigenous and the outerallies.
He escaped the destruction of autonomist forces in 1934, and then hewas in the Shaanix